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W. BALZER
A LOGICAL RECONSTRUCTION OF PURE EXCHANGE
ECONOMICS
INTRODUCTION
Most economists think that a logical reconstruction of economic theories
is trivial, some even would say that it is nonsense to force their theories into
the Procrustean bed of logics. That such work, in fact, is not trivial can be
seen from existing textbooks. There are practically no textbook presen-
tations for which the following quotation from [7] would be wrong! :
From the standpoint of logical rigour and precision, however, none of the existing treat-
ments... seems to be entirely free from serious defects. None of them comes even elose to
satisfying the standards set, let us say, by Hilbert in bis axiomatization of Euelidean
geometry.
Precision, perhaps, is not necessary in order to be able to use a theory. It is
necessary, however, if we want to say something non-trivial about such a
theory. Formal reconstructions of existing theories are not intended prim-
arily to induce progress in the field reconstructed. They are intended to
provide a basis for reflecting on theories in general, i.e. they provide a basis
for the philosophy of science.
My aim in this paper is to present a logical reconstruction of pure ex-
change economics (PEE). PEE contains the very core of micro-economic
theories which use utility functions. It is called 'pure' because money and
production are not treated explicitly. So PEE yields a rather simple logical
structure. This allows to depict methodologieal issues in a clear and simple
way without drowning in a flood of technicalities. On the other hand, the
principle issues of PEE are essentially the same as in more complicated,
'realistic' and 'modern' micro-economic theories - just because the latter
with practically no exception logically contain the princil?les of PEE. This
indicates two more special aims. First, PEE's reconstruction is intended to
yield a basis for further investigation of different micro economic theories
and their intertheoretic relations, and second, it is intended to elucidate the
status of the utility function which is the central and crucial concept of
micro-economic theories.
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My reconstruction is based on the standard texts [1], [4], [6] and [8], and
will follow very closely the exposition in [6], p. 126 ff. As a descriptive tool I
will use set theoretie predicates, and I also will adopt some ideas of Sneed's
concerning the logical strueture of empirieal theories (compare [3], [9],
[10]). The reader is assumed to be familiar with set theoretic notation.
I. BASIC CONCEPTS
We will need seven basic coneepts in order to describe PEE's models. First,
we need 'eeonomic agents' or simply persons. There are finitely many of
them involved in an economie system and the corresponding fonnal notion
is a set $i = {i1, ... , in}, where i1, ••• , in represent those persons. Second we
need kinds of eommodies. It is assumed that there are finitely many of
them, e.g. lettuee, milk, corn, VWs, Boeing 727's ete. The corresponding
notion is a set G = {I, ..., m} of natural numbers. Each natural number in
G represents a distinct kind of eommodity. This identifieation has the
advantage that the kinds of eommodities are linearly ordered in a natural
way. Third, we need quantities of commodities. All information about
quantities of eommodities as distributed among t'he individuals of the
eeonomic system will be lumped together into one single coneept: a fune-
tion qO:$i x G -+ IR~. 'qO (i, g) = !x' means 'person i owns or consumes
quantity IX ofcommodity number g'. tN, IR, IR + and IR~ denote the natural,
real, real positive and real non-negative numbers, respeetively. Fourth, we
have a funetion ij:G -+ IR+ which is interpreted as folIows. To each kind of
commodity g E G qassigns the total amount ij(g) of that kind ofcommodity
whieh 'exists' in the economie system, Irg, for instance, denotes 'milk' and
the economie system eonsists of a distinct village then q(g) is the total quan-
tity of milk which at the moment of consideration is present.
The fifth notion is that of price. We use a price function p:G -+ IR+
assigning to eaeh kind of eommodity a number p(g) which denotes the
price of one unit of this commodity. Prices are assumed to be positive for
zero prices indicate that arbitrary amounts of this 'eommodity' are
available. Sueh a 'commodity' is no commodity is the sense of economics.
The most important concept is, sixth, the coneept of utility. Each person
derives a certain utility from given amounts of each kind of commodity he
ownes or consumes. Formally, we introduce a funetion2 U:$i x IRm -+ IR
'U(i, !Xl' ... , IXm) = ß' means 'person i's utility derived from quantities 1X1'
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••• , !Xm of commodities I, ..., m respectively is ß'. That is, if i owns !Xl units
of commodity land ... and !Xm units of commodity m then' his utility
derived from the commodities is ß. If we replace iX1 , ... , iXm by what i
actually possesses, namely q0(i, 0, ...,qO(i, m) we obtain an expression U(i,
q0(i, I), ..., q0(i, m)) for i's actual utility. Finally, we need a set E of
equilibrium distributions. By a distribution we mean any function of the
type of qO. Any such function describes some possible way of distributing
commodities among the individuals. One way of stating the aim of PEE is
to say that it aims at characterizing equilibrium distributions. PEE states
the conditions under which a given distribution yields economical equilib-
rium.
Integrating these notions into a structure we obtain
DI xis a potential model of PEE (in symbols: XE M p) iff thereexist
$', G, ij, qO, p, U, E such that
(1) x = <§, G, ij, qO, p, U, E)
(2) $' is a finite, non-empty set and G = {I, ... , m} ~ IN
(3) q':G -+ IR +
(4) qO: § x G -+ 1R'i>
(5) p:G -+ IR+
(6) U:$' x IRm -+ IR is smooth
(7) E ~ {q/q:§ x G -+ 1R'i>}
We do not allow for negative values for quantities owned by persons -
(DI-4) Intuitively, this would amount to allowing for debts. (DI-3)
guarantees that all kinds of commodities considered are available to a cer-
tain extent. Commodities with zero total amounts are not relevant and can
be exc1uded. The values of U (DI-6) are not required to be non-negative.
But the additive structure of IR is not really relevant here. No intuitive
distinction is attached with the distinction between positive and negative
real numbers. Only the ordering matters. It may be noted that prices are
independent from individuals - i.e. they are the same for all persons - and
that the individual utilities depend only on the amounts of commodities
owned by the respective individuals. i's utility does not depend on what
other persons possess which exc1udes external effects.
In order to state the axioms we need two auxiliary concepts.
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D2 Let x = <JF, G, q: qO, p, U, E) E M p•
(a) Zx := {q/q:JF x G -+ IR; and Vg E G( I q(i, g) ~ q"(g»} is
ieF
called the consumption set (of x).
(b) Ex := {qlq E Zx and Vi E :F ( I. p(g) (q(i, g) - q0(i, g» = O)} is
geG
called the budget set of x).
Zx is a special kind of choice set, where a choice set is a set of possible
alternatives from which one alternative can be chosen. In the present case
the individuals have to choose among different possible distributions. They
will try to choose that distribution for which their utility is highest. The
choice set in question then is the set of all possible distributions. Since its
elements are distributions of commodities to be consumed this set in the
present context is called consumption set. Zx contains all distributions
which are possible under the constraint of the given total amounts of
commodities (ij). For each possible distribution q in Zx and for each g E G
the sum of the quantities owned by all individuals may not exceed the total
existing amount q"{g). The budget set Ex contains only those distributions
which are compatible with the given budgets of the individuals. Individual
i's budget is just the value of the bundle of commodities he owns: I. p(g)
geG
q0(i, g). A distribution q E Ex must leave aB these values unchanged: L:
. geG
p(g) q(i, g) = L: p(g) q0(i, g) for aB i E :F. Intuitively, Ex contains those
geG
redistributions of qO under which the individuals do not gain or lose some-
thing. The transition from qO to a q E Ex represents an economical change
in the course of which nobody has made profits, losses or debts.
II. THE AXIOMS
The models of PEE now can be described as foBows.
D3 xis a model of PEE (x E M) iff there exist :F, G, q: qO, p, U and E
such that
(1) x = <JF, G, q: qO, p, U, E)
(2) XE M p
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(3) qO E Zx
(4) EE Bx
(5) 'rIq(q E E - 'rIi E !F 'rIq' E Bx ( U(i, q'(i, 1), ... , q'(i, m»:s; U(i, q(i, 1),
... , q(i, m))))
(6) E ::I: 0
A model contains exactly the concepts described in (Dl), i.e. it is a poten-
tial model. In order to understand the axioms (D3-3H6) it is helpfuI to
imagine an economic system as evolving in three steps. Initially, a distri-
bution of commodities qO is given. In a second step exchanges are per-
formed until nobody wants to exchange any more or cannot exchange any
more. The latter may occur if some person has come to a point where he
needs aB his commodities for his own provision. In a final stage, after
exchanges have been performed, we have a new distribution q of com-
modities. It must be stressed that this is only an auxiliary picture. No time
is involved in (D3): PEE is a static theory.
(D3-3) says that the initial distribution (or the actual distribution) qO is
possible relative to the total amounts of commodities given by q~ (D3-4)
requires the equilibrium distributions to satisfy the budget constrains ex-
pressed in Bx ' Distribution q originating from qO by exchange is an equilib-
rium distribution only if in the course of exchange nobody has made econ-
omical gains or losses. (D3-5) is the central axiom expressing 'maximiz-
ation of utilities'. Intuitively, it says that q is an equilibrium distribution
only if all individual utilities derived from q are maximal with respect to Bx '
That is, there is no distribution q' in Bx which yields greater utilities.
Roughly, this amounts to saying that aB individuals try to maximize their
utility. Hut in doing so they are restricted to exchange within the scope of
their budgets. They maximize their utilities under the constraints imposed
on them by owning only finite values under the initial distribution qO. Such
a 'maximal' distribution is rightly caBed an equilibrium distribution for if
people have maximized their utilities under the budget constraints there is
no reason for further exchanges. Further exchanges could not increase
their utilities. So they will stay in such astate - in equilibrium - until
'external' influences (e.g. production ofnew commodities) change the situ-
ation. (D3-6) require that there exists at least one equilibrium distribution.
In order to get an idea of what such a model is like imagine a small
viBage in the early middle-ages. Men working on the fields, women making
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clothes, perhaps some people with special abilities being able to make e.g. a
finer brand of shoes or saddles or earthenware. Twice a year a tradesman
passes with luxuries from the great world. On certain occasions exchange
will take place. Peasant A having three cows and meadows for at most four
cows will try to get rid of one of the two calves just born by two of his cows.
Perhaps he makes the change to complete the dowry of his daughter by
some nice pieces made by Mrs. B. Peasant C whose single cow presently
gives no milk, fetches some milk for his children from his neighbour, per-
haps he takes some salads with him in order to compensate. Money is not
needed, the whole system economically is (nearly) closed. (This naive de-
scription must not bring up the impression that PEE has a very limited
scope. In principle western economical societies (countries) can be de-
scribed alike; only they are exposed to various other - partly non-econ-
omical- constraints.)
From such a piece of reality one could find out the total amounts of
commodities and their initial distribution among the individuals, i.e. one
could determine qand qO. The real situation is a model ofPEE if, roughly,
people can exchange their commodities such that everybody maximizes his
utilities relative to the constraints of not changing the value of his budget.
If such an exchange is possible there is some plausibility for its being
performed. And after exchange has taken place there will be no need - at
least for a short time - to exchange further. In this period the real system
will be an immediate model of the axioms: the axioms will be satisfied for
the actual distribution.
It may be noted that we have not required all markets to be cleared. This
axiom is a special axiom which can be added to those of (D3) but, we think,
it does not belong to the core of those basic axioms to be satisfied in all
micro-economic situations. We will introduce this axiom in Sec. VII by
means of a specialization. Note also that E may contain several members.
In models as described by (D3) the mathematical form of U is not specified
so that models with different equilibrium distributions are possible. There
is no reason to require exactly one such distribution from the beginning.
1II. SOME THEOREMS
We will summarize here some results about the formal theory just de-
scribed. The first three theorems are weIl known in economics. Our main
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concern with these is to fonnulate them precisely and to adjust them to our
tenninology. A further theorem will clarify the logical relations ofthe basic
concepts.
Let us denote by Vi the function Vi:/R'" -+ IR, defined by Ui(~l' ... , ~"') :
= U(i, ~1' ..• , ~",). Let us further denote by DjUi thej-th partial derivation
of Vi and by :~ (r, K) the functional matrix (;:: (r, K)}'i S'" at (r, ,,) for
g:1R2'" -+ IR"', r = (IXl , ..., rx",) and K = <ßl' ..., ß",).
n Ifx = (!F,G, ij qO,p, V, E)isamodelofPEEandqE Eis such
that for all i e!F and g E G: q(i, g) > 0 then there exist real
numbers Ai such that for all g E G: D9Vi(q(i, 1), ... , q(i, m» =
AJJ(g)
Proof: (I) Ui:lR'" -+ IR is continuously differentiable. Oefine g:!R'" -+ IR
by g(IXl , ... , rx",) = L PU) (rxj - q0(i, J). Then (2) g is continuously
js",
dilferentiable, too. Let r : = (q(i, I), ... , q(i, m». We have (Dlg(r), ... ,
D",g(r» = <P(I), ...,p(m», so (3) (Dlg, . .. , D",g) has maximal rangfat r.
By (02-b) and (D3--4): (4) g(r) = O. Now let «(Xl' ... , IX",> J1 such that
g(~l' ..., IX",) = 0 and ~j > 0 for j = I, ... , m. There exists a q' E B", such
that q'(i,J) = ~j for j = 1, ..., m. By (03-5) Vi(rx l , ... , IX",) :::; Ui(q(i, 1), ... ,
q(i, m». So (5) Vi' restricted to the set {K/g(K) = 0 /\ " > O} has a
maximum at point r. (Tl) now follows from (1)--(5) and a weIl known
theorem on extrema under subsidiary conditions (see e.g. (12), p. 350).
The expression
RS(' . k ). = DjVt<q(i, 1), , q(i, m»
I,J, , q. D/,ui(q(i, 1), , q(i, m»
is called the rate of substitution of individual i for commodities j and k.
(Tl) implies the standard result that in equilibrium the rates of substitution
are the same for all individuals and are equal to the price ratios of the
respective commodities.
Tl If (!F, G, ij qO,p, U, E) is amodel ofPEE and qE E, q > 0 then
for all i, i' E :F andj, k E G:
RS(i,j, k, q) = RS(i',j, k, q) = p(j)/p(k)
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Proof: Obvious from (Tl).
13 Let (!F, G, ij,l,p, U, E) be a model ofPEE, i E!F, q E E, q > 0
and let U be such that for A E IR the function g;.: 1R2'" --+ IR"',
defined by g;.(lX t , ... , IX"" ßt, ... , ßm) := (D t Ui(ßt, ... , ß",) - AlX t ,
... , DmUlßt, ... , ßm) - AlXm ) satisfies the following condition:
det (~~ (p(1), ... , p(m), q(i, I), ... , q(i, m))) i:- 0. 5
Then there exists a function f defined on a neighbourhood of
(p(1), ... , p(m) such thatf(p(1), ... , p(m)) = (q(i, I), ... , q(i,
m)
Proof: By (Tl) there is AE IR such that Vg E G(DgUi(q(i, I), ... , q(i, m)) =
Ap(g)). Choose such a Aand consider g : = g;. as defined above. Then (1)
g(P(l), ... , p(m), q(i, 1), ... , q(i, m)) = O. (DI-6) implies that g is
continuously differentiable at point (p(1), ... , p(m), q(i, I), '" q(i, m).
There are neighbourhoods V of (p(l), ... , p(m) and W of (q(i, 1), ... , q(i,
m) such that (2) g is continuously differentiable on V x Wand (3): detG: ("C, K)) i:- 0 for all ("C, K) E V X W. From (1)-(3) it follows by the
theorem on implicit functions (e.g. (11), p. 277) that there are neighbour-
hoods Va S Vof (p(l), ... , p(m) and JtQ S' W of (q(i, I), ... , q(i, m) and
a unique function f: Va --+ Wo such that for all "C EVa: g("C, fi"C)) = O.
Especially, this implies g(p(l), ... , p(m),fip(l), ... , p(m))) = 0 and, sincefis
unique,fip(1), ... , p(m)) = (q(i, 1), ... , q(i, m).
T4 In PEE the terms ij, qO, p, U and E are mutually independent
from each other.
Proof: Let x = (!F, G, ij, qO, p, U, E) be defined as follows: !F : = {i, n,
G:= {1,2},ij(l) = ij(2) = l,q°(j,k) = Ij2forjE!FandkEG,p(l) =
p(2) = 1. E = {qO} and for i E!F let Ui :1R2 --+ IR be defined by Uj(lX, ß) = IX
+ ß. Clearly, x is a model ofPEE. Now we have to show that for ')I E {ij, qO,
p, U, E} there exists a ')I' i:- ')I and an y such that (I) y is a model of PEE, (2)
y' is a component of y and ')I' occurs in y at the same place at which ')I
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occurred in x, and (3) all components e {q, qO, p, V, E} different from y are
the same in x and in y.
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
::0.... ""'" '!"
Y = q. Definey':= q1byqtk) = q(k) + 1 forkeG. Theny =)0
<!F, G, ijl, qO, p, V, E> is a model of PEE.
y = qO. Let qO'(i, 1) = qO'(i', 2) = 1/4 and qO'(i, 2) = qO'(i', 1) =
3/4. Then y = <!F, G, q, qO', p, V, E> is a model of PEE.
y = p. Letp'(1) = p'(2) = 2. Then y = <!F, G, q qO,p', V, E> is
a model of PEE.
y = U. For je !F define Vj:1R 2 -+ IR by Vj(a., ß) = a.ß. It is easily
checked that y = <!F, G, q qO, p, V', E> is a model of PEE.
y = E. Let E' = {qO, qO'} where qO, is defined as in clause (2).
Then y = <!F, G, q, qO, p, V, E'> is a model of PEE.
Note that !F and G are not independent from the other concepts just
because they are contained, for instance, in qO as components of qO's
domain.
IV. THEORETICAL CONCEPTS
We now turn to the question which of the basic concepts of PEE are
theoretical with respect to PEE and which are not. According to Sneed
component t oftheory Tis theoretical with respect to Tiff every method of
determination of talready presupposes that Tis true (for details see (2)). If
t is a function (or a predicate) the method of determination consists of
finding out the function value t(xl , ••• , xn) (the truth value t(xl , .•. , x n) e
{W, F}) for given arguments Xl' •.. , xn• And that such a method presup-
poses Tto be true means that the axioms describing a measuring apparatus
ofthe relevant form logically imply the basic axioms of T. This criterion of
theoreticity has been successfully applied to several theories and need not
be defended here. What are the results of applying it in the present case?
Clearly, !F and Gare PEE-non-theoretical. In order to determine whet-
her something is a person or a kind of commodity we neither make use of
nor presuppose the principle of maximization of uti1ity3. It is also clear
that quantities of commodities belonging to distinct persons can be de-
termined without presupposing economical axioms. So qand qO are PEE-
non-theoretical, too.
In case ofp we have to ask: How can we determine p(g) for a given kind
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of commodity g? The first answer which refers to the realistic situation of a
market is that we just have to ask the merchants, i.e. those individuals
which offer commodities. But this method might yield different prices for g
due to different answers of different merchants. This conflicts with our
treatment ofpas independent from the individuals. In order to obtain one
price to which a11 individuals would subscribe it seems that we have to
presuppose astate of economical equilibrium for only in equilibrium dif-
ferent individuals will agree on one price (compare T2) of Sec. 11I). This
would suggest p being PEE-theoretical. There is, however, a PEE-indepen-
dent method of determination for p. One has to observe the quantities
people exchange. For two commodities g and g' and two persons i and i'
we can calculate the ratio of the quantities of g and g' actually exchanged
by i and i'. This ratio might be called 'individual price ratio ?fg and g' for i
and r. From individual price ratios we can come to absolute individual
prices by convention, i.e. by declaring the price of a unit of some fixed
commodity to be one. Now we take the arithmetical means of all the
individual prices of any commodity to be the price of that commodity. This
method certainly leads to prices even in situations where the principle of
maximization of utility is not realized. So we have a method of determi-
nation not presupposing PEE and therefore p is PEE-non-theoreticaI4 .
The determination of utility is still more involved. How can we de-
termine VU, IX, ••• , ttm)? This question leads to a far reaching methodolo-
gical issue which in this paper can only be outlined. A detailed treatment
must be postponed to another paper for reasons of space.
Our claim is that V is PEE-theoretical. In order to defend this claim we
have to make plausible that all methods of determination for V presuppose
PEE. This, of course, cannot be 10gicaBy proved for we have no axiomatic
description of the class of all methods of determination for U. But still
there are good arguments in favour of this claim. We distinguish two
classes of methods of determination for U which seem to be complete
insofar as aB known methods belong to one of them.
Methods of determination of the first class work as folIows. One presup-
poses V's mathematical form. The determination of U(i, IX I , ... , <Xm ) then
amounts to specify the arguments i, IX I , ••• , IXm and to ca/cu/ale the function
value V(i, <Xl' ••• , cxm). If, for instance, V has the form
m
UU, IXI' ... , IXm) = L ßk log (cxk - bk )
k=l
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and the real numbers Pl' ... , P"" <5 1 , ••. , <5", are given then, in fact, U(i, (1(1'
... , (1(",) can be calculated by purely mathematical means. Such methods of
determination presuppose PEE in the following sense. In order to be ac-
cepted as a reasonable method of determination for utilities (and not just
for abstract real numbers of the form U(i, (1(1' ... , (1(",)) the mathematical
form of U has to be 'economically reasonable'. Hut for such economically
reasonable Us one can prove the existence of equilibrium distributions6 .
That is, 'reasonable economical' form of U implies PEE's axioms. So all
methods of the first dass presuppose PEE and therefore suggest U being
PEE-theoretical. Intuitively, these methods presupposing U to be known
in advance were feit to be unsatisfactory because it is undear how Us
special form is found.
Methods of determination from the second dass were developed in
order to solve this problem. One was looking for methods of determining
U without presupposing PEE. The basic idea is to start with a notion of
preference and to formulate axioms sufficiently strong to allow adefinition
of U in terms of preferences. Thus the problem of determination of U is
reduced to determining truth values of sentences of the form 'Person i
prefers quantity (I( of g to quantity (1(' of g". Intuitively, it seems that there
are methods of determination of the latter kind which do not pressupose
PEE, for to prefer one thing to another seems to be something different
from maximizing one's utility. Thus carrying out this idea - which mean-
while has been done successfully - seems to yield a proof of U's non-theore-
ticity in PEE. There seem to be methods of determination for U where we
have to check only preferences and where Us values can be derived from
the results obtained about preferences. This observation has led to a de-
crease of interest in utility functions among economists. The prevailing
tendency seems to be that utility can be dispensed with, and that it makes
more sense to 'stay doser to the facts' by investigating preferences or
developing econometrical theories.
Hut the conclusion from the existence of theories of preference allowing
definitions of utility to Us PEE-non-theoreticity turns out to be too rash.
For by looking doser at the relation between theories of preference and
PEE it turns out that theories of preference can be reduced to PEE in the
precise sense of 'strong reduction' of [3]. Hut such a reduction yields a
strong logical connection between both theories which gives rise to a
weaker version of 'presuppose' as used in Sneed's criterion of theoreticity.
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Term t in this weaker sense is T-theoretical if every method of determi-
nation for t either presupposes Tin the old sense or yields a model of some
theory T' which can be reduced to T. This weaker version has been intro-
duced and discussed in [2] where its plausibility was demonstrated by two
examples from classical mechanics. Now according to this weaker criterion
U remains PEE-theoretical despite the fact that U can be defined via
'underlying' theories of preference. For all reasonable methods of deter.mi-
nation of preference can be shown to imply the basic axioms of suitable
theories ofpreference. And since the latter can be reduced to PEE the weak
form of the criterion is satisfied. Intuitively, this is so because in order to
determine whether person i prefers x to y 'presupposes' that i be a rational
economic agent - trying to obtain those things he or she mostly prefers -
and this in turn is just another form of stating that i maximizes its utility.
We conclude that U is PEE-theoretical (in the weaker sense).
U's theoreticity implies that of E. For members of E can be determined
only by means of the theory: we have to determine whether q satisfies the
axioms in order to determine whether q belongs to E or not. But in order to
demonstrate that q satisfies the axioms we must presuppose U and there-
fore PEE.
V. HOW TO USE THE FORMALISM
The considerations of Sec. IV give rise to a discussion of the actual use of
PEE's models made by economists. For if our claim of U's PEE-theore-
ticity is correct some widely accepted uses of PEE are submitted to con-
siderable constraints.
The first use of PEE's models is this. One presupposes the utility func-
tions as given and uses the axioms in order to calculate or to predict the
quantities of commodities which will be exchanged provided the system
will attain astate of equilibrium. That is, starting from a given U econ-
omists predict the individual demands and offers to be expected if the
system comes into equilibrium. These predictions essentially use (T3) of
Sec. In. For (T3) says, given U, p and suitable conditions of 'well-behaved-
ness' of U an equilibrium distribution is uniquely determined (by the f in
T3» by the prices.
Another way ofusing PEE is to presuppose U and to calculate or predict
equilibrium prices from given distributions. That is, on the assumption
that U is known and has special properties, and that q is given and the
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system will attain equilibrium economists calculate the prices that will
obtain in equilibrium. This use is possible because of (T2) which deter-
mines price-ratios in terms of utilities.
Both these uses are mentioned in a typical quotation from [6], p. 126:
'theoretical analysis contains data, variables, and behaviour assumptions
that allow the determination of specific values for the variables once the
data are known'. And
The data for the determination of a general multimarket equilibrium are the utility... func-
tions of all consumers and their initial. .. endowments of. .. commodities. The variables are
the prices of all ... commodities and the quantities purchased and sold by each consumer. ..
The behaviour assumptions require utility... maximization with the condition that every
market be cleared. ([6], p. 127).
Finally PEE can be used to determine utility functions. That is, assum-
ing qO and p to be given one tries to find utility functions which - when
added to qO and p - yield a non-empty set of equilibrium distributions. A
fourth use of the formalism differs from the last one only in checking
whether the equilibrium distributions predicted by PEE in fact coincide
with those actually being reached after exchanges. All these four uses are
compatible with our formulation which therefore can be said to be 'neutral
to actual usage'.
It is illuminating to compare these uses to the use of the axioms of, say,
classical mechanics. These axioms in a crude way can be rephrased by a
differential equation
(+) ms = j{s)
where s is the position function (representing a particle's path), and m andf
denote mass and force, respectively. Physicists often use this equation by
presupposing m and fand solving it in order to obtain 'admissible' position
functions. This corresponds to the first use of PEE. Second, they also try to
find out m by presupposing s andfas given - which corresponds to PEE's
second use. And third, they start with sand try to see whether m and f can
be found satisfying (+) above. This corresponds to the third and fourth
use ofPEE.
Now the fact of Us being PEE-theoretical (or, similarly, of m and f
being theoretical in mechanics) imposes restrictions on the first two uses:
to use PEE in these two ways does not yield empirical claims. In other
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words: starting from given utilities is not compatible with claiming to
arrive by using PEE at empirical statements or empirical predictions. Or
still more sharply: those uses of PEE have only intra-theoretical value
comparable to the value of mathematical proofs in mathematics.
This is a strong offence but as soon as one accepts the PEE-theoreticity
of U one is forced to surrender. The argument runs like this. The deriv-
ation of prices or quantities from given utilities by means of PEE can yield
empirical statements or predictions only if PEE is applied to a co~crete
system and if it is possible to test that this system is a model of PEE. But to
test whether some system is a model of PEE it is necessary to determine the
values of the functions occurring in PEE, especially of U. Now determi-
nation of the values of U presupposes - because of the theoreticity criterion
- that the process of determination already is a model of PEE. If one wants
to test whether this process of determination indeed is a model of PEE one
is in the same situation as at the beginning. That is, the attempt to test
PEE's axioms in concrete systems ends in circularity. In the two uses of
PEE mentioned above - where U is assumed to be given - this amounts to
the following. Statements arrived at in this way can be called empirical
only if it can be empirically tested that U in fact has the form it Is assumed
to have. But the test of U immediately leads to a circle of the kind just
described. This is a special instance of what Stegmüller has called the
problem of theoretical terms in his [9].
The only uses of PEE which are free from this difficulty are those in
which qO and p are 'observed' and U is 'calculated' in a way to fit the
axioms. This can indeed lead to testable or empirical statements for 'ob-
serving' qO and p does not imply circularities of the above kind. But what
do these empirical statements look like? Roughly, they say that for given
qO and p there exists - there 'can be found' - a utility function such that qO,
p and U satisfy the axioms. This certainly is not the typical form of what
was thought to be an empirical statement. However, if U is PEE-theoret-
ical then only statements of this form can be called empirical, provided we
do not want 'empiricity' to include 'circularity'.
More precisely, the only use of PEE that yields an empirical claim is the
following. We consider those structures obtained from potential models by
omitting the theoretical terms U and E. They are called partial potential
models and defined as folIows.
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D4 y is a partial potential model of PEE (y E M pp) iff there exist ~,
G, ij, qO and p such that
(1) y = <~, G, q, qO, p)
(2) requirements (2)-(5) of (D I) are satisfied
Now a class of concrete economical systems is specified: the class of PEE's
intended applications, denoted by I. (The problems connected with I will
be discussed in the followingSection.) Let us for the moment assurne that
there is a class of intended applications of PEE. There are no difficulties in
further assuming that these intended applications can be described as par-
tial potential models. So we may assurne that there is a set I !:; M pp of
intended applications. Now we can use PEE in order to formulate an
empirical claim as folIows: for each intended application y there exists a
utility function U such that U together with y satisfies the axioms and
yields a non-empty set of equilibrium distributions. A claim of this form
can be called 'empirical' because intuitively its truth depends on how the
intended applications look. We can think of intended applications for
which suitable utility functions exist, and we can think of intended appli-
cations - with the qualifications to follow in Sec. VI - for which there is no
utility function satisfying PEE's axioms.
VI. IS PEE 'PURE' OR 'EMPIRICAL'?
Even if we exclude those uses of PEE which start from utility functions,
and concentrate on the use of PEE as a means of finding the 'right' utilities
there still is the question of empiricity. Thequestion 'Is PEE an empirical
theory?' or 'Does PEE have empirical content?' cannot be settled by a
straightforward "yes" in the face of the lack of - or very slowprogress in
the formulation of - true predictions. Although empirical claims of the
form sketched at the end of Section V are free from intrinsic difficulties
there are reasons for doubt. Before discussing these let us precisely re-
formulate the empirical claim.
D5 (a) If x = <~, G, (j, qO,p, U, E) E M p then r(x) := <~, G, q, qO,p)
(b) Y(M) := {y E M pp/3x E M(r(x) = y)}
(c) The empirical claim of PEE formulated with M and I is that:
I !:; r(M)
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r just cuts off theoretical tenns from models of PEE. The empirical claim
then says that the intended applications can be augmented by theoretical
tenns such that one obtains a set ofmodels. Conversely, ifwe call r(x) the
'reduct' of x then (05-c) says that every intended application is a reduct of
some model.
Now the first reason to doubt PEE's empiricity comes from the follow-
ing theorem.
T5 For every Y s; M pp : Y s; V(M)
Proof: We have to show that for y = <S-, G, ij, qO,p)e M pp there exist U
and Esuch that x = <S-, G, ij qO,p, U, E)e M. We take E = {qO}, then E
'i= 0and E s; Bx ' So all we have to do is to find a function U such that (01-
6) and (03-5) are satisfied. This can be done by defining functions Ui:lRm
-+ IR such that (01-6) holds and each Vi has an absolute maximum at point
<q0(i, 1), ... , q0(i, m». Such functions are found easily. For instance, we
can take the weil known
1 - ~ L (', -q'(i, k»2
V i(CX 1, ... , cxm):= J(21T.)m e h.
(T5) shows that the empirical claim fonnulated with M and I is true no
matter how Ilooks. Ifwe take an arbitrary economical system and describe
it as a partial potential model we are always sure to find utility functions
which satisfy PEE's axioms. In this sense the empirical claim fonnulated
with land M is trivial or empirically empty.
It is not convincing, however, to use this fact as an argument against
PEE's empiricity. For we have similar situations in well-established physi-
cal theories - as for instance classical mechanics and classical equilibrium
thermodynamics - which nobody would hesitate to call empirical. The
general situation of mature empirical theories seems to be that empirical
claims fonnulated with the very basic axioms only turn out to be empty in
the way made precise by (T5). In the case of physical theories this triviality
is eliminated by adducing to the basic axioms two further kinds of require-
ments: constraints and speciallaws. Constraints are requirements 'across'
different models while speciallaws are additional requirements to hold in
models which already satisfy the basic axioms.
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Concerning constraints in economics we cannot refer to explicit state-
ments of economists because there are none. Intuitively, constraints say
how things behave if they are 'transported' from one application (or
model) to a different one. Usually one expects that 'instrinsic' properties
do not change from system to system. The elassical example stems from
physics. There, the mass of a body is an intrinsic property which does not
change, at least in tb,.e elassical theory, when the body is transported to a
different application. Constraints are necessary only if we want to take
serious the idea of a theory having many different 'local' applications - and
not only one big universal application.
The only reasonable candidate in PEE is an equality constraint for the
individual utility functions Ui defined by Ui ( a l , ... , am) = UU, a l , ... , am).
An equality constraint requires that something - namely Ui in the present
case - remains equal in different systems. It seems natural to think of utility
as something intrinsic to the economic 'agent. If an individual is given a
certain bundle of commodities the utility depends on the quantities of these
commodities and on nothing else. It does not change, for instance, when
the individual emigrates to another economical system (country). This, it
might be argued, contradicts to what actually happens because it is well
known that people's tastes change when people change their surroundings.
There are two aspects of this objection. First, change is something we
cannot express in the present vocabulary. What can we do to deal with
such phenomena if we do not want to wait until sociologists provide a
successful theory of how people's tastes change? Are we to give up the
theory or will the theory still be of some value even if we exelude such
phenomena? This is of course the question of whether the 'ceteris paribus'
condition is acceptable. The reader will not expect a decisive answer to this
question. The second aspect of the objection refers to the concept of time
implicitly used when speaking ofchange. One might argue that PEE is static
or very 'local' with respect to time. So changes which evidently take a lot of
time are not relevant for the theory. But this reveals a wrong conception of
the role of constraints. Even in static theories constraints cover dynamical
aspects. Two different applications in which the same individual occurs may
be separated by quite a big interval of time. Indeed, it will always take time
for a person to travel from one application (place) to another,
We will assume for the moment that ceteris can be paribus and for-
mulate an equality constraint for the functions Ui' .
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D6 Cis the constraint for PEE iff for aB X:
X E C iff X ~ M p and
Vx,x'E1ViVq:x = (:F, G, q, qO,p, U, E) /\ x' = (:F', G', q, qO~,
p', U', E') /\ i E :F n :F' /\ q E Zx n Zx' --+ U{i, q{i, 1), ... , q(i,
m)) = U'(i, q(i, 1), ... , q(i, m)).
The elements Xof C can be imagined as combinations of models a combi-
nation being characterized by the fact that the utilities of a person i occur-
ring in different models at the same time are the same in all those models.
Such combinations of models come up either successively in time or if
different models are considered which are sub-systems of each other, e.g. a
town and a country.
Using this constraint the empirical claim of PEE defined in (D5) can be
sharpened to an empirical claim with respect to I, M and C.
D7 (a) A(M, C):= {YjY ~ M pp /\ Y ~ r(M) /\ 3X(XE C /\ r(X) =
Y)}
(b) the empirical claim ofPEE with respect to I, M and Cis that I E
A(M, C)
(b) says that 1consists of reducts of models and, in addition, I is a combi-
nation of reducts such that the theoretical augmentations form a combi-
nation satisfying the constraint. For this stronger claim we cannot prove a
theorem analogous to (T5). On the contrary, the foBowing seems to be
true.
T6 Not for every Y ~ Mpp : Y ~ A(M, C)
Although we have no formal proof of (T6) we are rather convinced of its
being true. Intuitively, if Y is infinite and even non-denumerable a con-
struction similar to that in the proof of (T5) does not seem to work any
longer.
So the first reason to doubt PEE's empiricity, namely the triviality ofthe
empirical claim formulated with M and 1 can be devaluated by assuming
the ceteris paribus condition to make sense in PEE. If this assumption is
taken for granted then the non-triviality of the empirical claim I E A(M, C)
will depend on the special form of 1.
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Here there is a second difficulty for PEE's empiricity. For there is doubt
whether PEE in fact has something like a set of intended applications. The
general method offixing I is to list some 'paradigm' elements of I - e.g. the
city of Nürnberg on a market day in the 15th century - and to say that all
other elements of I be sufficiently similar to those paradigm elements. All
elements of I must of course describe real systems. But in economics we
cannot point out a single real, conerete system whieh is commonly ac-
cepted by economists to be a standard example of PEE. There are those
who will say that since there are no accepted intended applications PEE is
no empirical theory at all but rather a 'pure' theory. A pure theory is a
theory in which intended applications and empirical claims do not matter.
Pure theories are not constructed in order to formulate empirical claims,
they are constructed for other reasons. In pure theories also there is no
need to draw a distinction between theoretical and non-theoretical terms
which is relevant only for the formulation of empirical claims. Sy looking
on what economists actually do one feels strongly inclined to agree that
they, in fact, construct pure theories. Studies in the historical development
of economical theories (e.g. (5)) enforce this view.
But on the other hand - and here we leave the position of descriptive
philosophy of science - by reflecting on why this is so one is lead to en-
tertain the idea that an empirical form of PEE at least should be possible.
There are three reasons why PEE has no intended applications. First, the
description of economical systems is very complex. Although the picture of
our medievaI village gives an impression of simplicity the situation is still
much more complex than, for instance, in models of physics. Even the
most simple models will contain a number of kinds of commodities and
persons, and hence a considerable number of quantities of commodities.
Complexitity becomes really relevant if we think of present day systems
with their huge numbers ofcommodities and persons. Second, even ifthere
were simple models in history the relevant data are not recorded and
cannot be fully reconstructed from the historicaI material available. Third,
and most important, it seems impossible to reproduce even the most simple
economicaI system in a way coming close to the original.
These three reasons up to now have been sufficient to suppress a de-
velopment of intended applications. But it seems not too fictitious to think
of astate of affairs in which these difficulties can be overcome to a certain
extent. With the help of computers very complex data structures can be
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recorded and stored for a long time. And if complexity is no longer the
main difficulty we can think of the possibility to recognize similar 'initial
conditions' in different systems although we might not be able to 'repro-
duce' any system.
VII. SPECIALIZATIONS
We conclude by giving some examples of specializations of the basic core
of PEE described so far. Specializations consist essentially of speciallaws
which are added to those of (D3). This yields another way to come to
stronger empirical claims - if empiricity is possible at all - or at least to
stronger theoretical models. Before describing these specializations let us
recall what might be called the basic core of PEE.
D8 (a) K is the basic core of PEE iff K = (Mp, M, M pp, C)
(b) T is the basic theory-element of PEE iff T = (K, l)
We speak of a 'theory-element' because PEE consists of more than just T.
Roughly, PEE consists of a net of elements of the same form as T such that
T provides a basis for the whole nel. If PEE is regarded as a pure theory
then (D8-b) is not relevant.
Specializations of K and T can be defined quite generally as follows.
D9 (a) K' is a core-specialization of K (K' (leK) iff there exist M' and C
such that
(1) K' = (Mp, M', M pp, C)
(2) M' ~ M
(3) C ~ C
(b) T', is a specialization of T (T' (l T) iff there exist K' and l' such
that
(1) T' = (K',1')
(2) K' (leK
(3) l' s;; I
(c) if Tl (l T and T2 (l T then Tl is a specialization of T2 (Tl (l T2 ) iff
Tl = «Mp , MI' M pp, Cl)' 11 ) and T2 = «Mp , M 2 , M pp, C2 ),
12 ) and MI S;; M 2 /\ Cl S;; C2 /\ 11 S;; 12
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Specializations of K and T consist just of restrictions of the set of models
M, and eventually of suitable restrictions of the constraints and intended
applications. In (D9-c) the notion of specialization is extended to arbitrary
'theory-elements' of the form of T which are specializations of T.
A first specialization is given by the special law expressing that in
equilibrium aB markets are cleared. We add this law as a further axiom to
those of (D3) thereby obtaining a subset MI of M.
DIO (a)x is a model of PEE with all markets cleared (x E MI) itT
(1) x = <fF, G, q, qO, p, U, E) E M
(2) Vg E G Vq E E (L q(i, g) = L q0(i, g)
iEY iEY
(b) KI : = <Mp, MI' M pp, C) and TI : = <K1 , 11 ) where 11 is a
suitable set of intended applications for K 1
In models of MI the total amount of commodity g as initiaBy distributed
among the individuals L q0(i, g) is the same after exchange for all com-
iEY
modities. Thus everything otTered has found a demand.
A second specialization is given by requiring utilities to increase with
increasing consumption of commodities.
DU (a)x is a model of PEE with increasing utilities (x E M 2) itT
(I) x = <fF, G, ij, qO, p, U, E) E M
(2) Vi E fFVq, q' E Zx: (Vg E G(q(i, g) < q'(i, g») --+ U(i, q(i, 1),
... , q(i, m» < U(i,q'(i, 1), ... , q'(i, m»
(b) K 2 : = <Mp, M 2 , M pp, C) and T2 : = <K2 , 12 ) where 12 is a
suitable set of intended applications for K2
If person i's bundle of commodities is increased from <q(i, 1), ... , q(i, m»
to <q'(i, 1), ... , q'(i, m) by increase of aB quantities then utility will in-
crease, too. This is a speciallaw which will not be satisfied in all of PEE's
applications. For instance, by consuming ever more ice cream utility does
not necessarily increase. A further specialization consists of the law of
decreasing marginal utility.
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DI2 (a)x is a model of PEE with decreasing marginal utilities (x E M 3) iff
(I) x = (g-, G, q, qO,p, U, E) e M
(2) XE Mz
(3) Vi E g-Vq, q' E Zx: (Vg E G(q(i, g) < q'(i, g») --t Vj E G(DjU(i,
q(i, 1), ... , q(i, m» < Dp(i, q'(i, 1), ... , q'(i, m»)
(b) K 3 : = (Mp , M 3 , M pp, C) and T3 : = (K3 , 13 ) where 13 is a set of
intended applications for K 3
DjU denotes the partial derivative of U with respect to its j + I-th argu-
ment. (2) requires U to increase with increasing quantities but (3) says that
this increase becomes ever smaller. If the original bundle of commodities
becomes bigger and bigger then an increase of this bundle will yield smaller
and smaller increases of utilities. F or a person with average salary 1000 $ in
addition will yield a considerable increase of utility. A person owing al-
ready 50000000 $ will hardly consider 1000 $ to affect his or her utility.
A final specialization requires U to have a very special mathematical
form already mentioned in Sec. IV: the form of a so called Stone-Geary
function.
D13 (a)x is a model of PEE with Stone-Geary function (x e M 4 ) iff
(I) x = (g-,G,ij,l,p, U,E)eM
(2) Vi E g- j ßp, ... , ß;m, bih ••• , b;m V(J.l' ••• , C(m U(i, (J.l' ••• , C(m) =
I ßu log «(J.j - bu)
j::Sm
(b) K4 : = (Mp' M 4 , M pp, C) and T4 : = (K4 , 14 ) where 14 is a set of
intended applications for K4
In Stone-Geary functions U can be determined as follows. First, for a
single commodity g the utility depends on the logarithm of the quantity (J.B
- (jg. So utility increases with increasing quantity and the marginal utility
decreases. bB denotes a minimal amount of commodity gwhich is necessary
for person i to survive. Only if i has at least quantity bg of commodity g its
utility is defined, if i has less the bg of g then i will not participate in the
economic system: i will be dead. This implies a little formal difficulty with
Usdomain whichhere is neglected. Second, each such utility is multiplied
with a 'weight' ßg expressing the 'importance' of commodity g with respect
to the other commodities. Finally, all these utilities are summed up in order
to yield the total utility.
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The following theorem is obvious.
T7 (a) for i = I, ...,4: Ki(JcK and Ti(JT
(b) T4(JT3 and T3(JT2, especially: K4(JcK3 and K3(JcK2
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We thus have a small 'theory-net' of specializatoons of PEE's basic theory-
element. A theory-net in this special context can be defined as follows.
D14 X is a theory-net over T iff there exist N and (J such that
(1) X = (N, (J>
(2) N is a finite set of specializations of T
(3) (J s; N x N is the specialization relation on N defined in (D9-b)
and (D9-c)
(4) TE N
(5) for all T' E N: T(JT
It is clear that, in general, empirical claims formulated with specializations
can be logically stronger than those formulated with the basic element. In
physics, for instance, there are many specializations with non-trivial empi-
rical claims. A last reason for doubt of PEE's being an empirical theory
now consists of the observation that the situation in PEE is different from
that in physics with respect to specializations. Whereas commonly ac-
cepted physical theories derive their empiricity from the existence of
specializations with non-trivial empirical claims in PEE even the specializ-
ations are empirically trivial. For instance, we have the following theorem.
Proof: For each y E M pp we have to find Vand E such that (y, V, E> E
M 4. This can be done by choosing E = {qO} and defining a Stone-Geary
utility function V such that all Vi are identical and touch the hyperplane Bx
exactly in point (q0(i, I), ... , q0(i, m». Ifqo is a point on the boundary of
Zx the domain of U has to be shifted suitably into the negative numbers.
The calculation of the coefficients ßI' ... , ßm' bl , ... , bm is a matter of
routine.
Universität München
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NOTES
I {7], p. 253. The authors there are dealing with c1assical mechanics. But the situation in
economics is the same.
2 m is just the number of kinds ofcommodities and uniquely given by G. We could have been
more pedantic and have chosen m as a primitive instead of G. But G is chosen to suggest that
kinds of commodities are entities different from natural numbers.
3 Of course there may be cases where we exclude a certain person from being treated as
economic agent (although being present in the economic system). For term t to be not T-
theoretical, however;it suffices to find at least one independent method ofmeasurement. So t
can be T-non-theoretical although there may be quite a number ofmethods of determination
for t which presuppose T.
4 I am indebted to E. Händler at this point. Also I want to thank B. Hamminga and M.
Küttner for helpful remarks on an earlier draft. The most simple method of determination for
pis of course to observe that all individual prices are equal. But Ws method does not always
work.
5 This condition is satisfied if, for instimce, det «Dj D.Ujj.•".J #- 0 at point <PO), ..., p(m),
q(i. I), ... , q(i, m).
• Such existence theorems belong to the most subtle results of modern economics. The first
theorem of this kind is due to Debreu.
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